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Share repurchases reached a decade-high level in 2019, just as US equity indices reached a 
historical zenith, a move in tandem that supports more than merely a correlative relation. 
However, this relationship moves beyond that of just a close tandem move in indices alongside 
share repurchases, but to the behavior of firms which began to leverage themselves in order to 
promote the evermore profitable strategy of large buyback programs. Those repurchases indicate 
an idiosyncratic and procyclical leveraging that, while much smaller in scope and less 
combustible by lack of derivative amplification, led to the gorging on unsustainable debt 
described by Hyman Minsky and experienced in the Great Financial Crisis in the banking 
industry. In this case, the ‘Minsky moment’ that may have inevitably popped the self-promotion 
bubble came in the form of the ‘black swan’ event of the coronavirus outbreak. This paper aims 
to historically frame the issues, with delimitation of the effect of buybacks from 2009 to early 
2020 with scant reference to historical factors influencing the increased usage of share 
repurchase programs. The analysis within this historical scope will reflect empirical measures on 
the market-wide level of share buybacks and debt levels alongside the concurrent equity index 
acceleration. Further, debt levels among firms more broadly will be employed to indicate 
leverage trends as it moves alongside share repurchase frequency. The paper will also make use 
of case studies, to illustrate the corporate governance that mirrors the points and cycle posited by 
Minsky. The paper will conclude with potential public policy lessons offered in bailout programs 
and their proper application as well as open questions on Federal Reserve policy and additional 
issues worthy of exploration in future papers.  
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Motivation:  
The emergence of equity markets to unprecedented heights less than a decade after one of the 
most significant crashes in history is often regarded as nothing short of miraculous. While the 
rationale for such a rise is multivariate, including novel and hyper-aggressive Federal Reserve 
action, record-low interest rates that encouraged equity risk, a rise in non-human market actors, 
and high levels of fiscal stimulus, the effect of share repurchase programs and their widespread 
utilization is perhaps at once overlooked and prescient. 
 
Hypothesis #1: Share buybacks increased largely in tandem with and helped support the record 
equity returns from 2009-2019. 
 
Hypothesis #2: The rise in share buybacks is indicative of growing irrationality among corporate 
boards and eventually led to ponzi-like behavior within the scope of these programs, especially 
in the use of debt to finance these programs. 
 
Hypothesis #3: The rampant use of buybacks, particularly those funded by debt, hampered 
overall market stability and were a significant factor in necessitating large scale bailout-like 
programs in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic.  
 
Methodology  
Qualitative aspects of the behavior such as the historical review of events and the behavioral 
impact as reflected in Minsky’s writings will be employed to ground the paper, while measures 
of the level of share buybacks, the correlated returns of major US indices, and the leverage ratios 
of US-based firms will buoy the empirical standing of the paper. Such data will be garnered from 
a broad array of sources, including major banks’ market analyses (such as Goldman Sachs and JP 






 The 2008 financial crisis has often been dubbed the quintessential example of a “Minsky 
Moment”, not least by those that would come to deal with its consequences in terms of policy1. 
From this event, much was gleaned as to the fragility of the banking system with various 
implications for both regulation and prudent firm behavior generally. While the cause of the 
2008 crisis that emanated from the US banking sector and soon rippled across most of the 
developed world was far from univariate, a notable degree of the impetus behind the implosion 
was in irrational behavior of both individuals and firms2. 
Foreseeing this type of irrationality was an at-the-time obscure economist, Hyman 
Minsky, who had predicted the paradoxical ‘destabilizing stability’3 found in the last gasps of the 
protracted Great Moderation. In his most cited, and indeed prophetic work, he noted that long 
periods of stability tend to push banking institutions from safe practices, what he termed “hedge 
finance”, towards more speculative finance as the illusion of everlasting stability cements itself. 
Eventually, this reaches its zenith in “ponzi finance”, which as the name suggests, is ultimately 
unsustainable4. While Minsky’s work pertains specifically to the financial sector, the rationale 
and logic of the increasingly risky behavior under the false assumption of diminished risk can 
apply more broadly.  
 
1 Yellen, J. L. (2009, April). Minsky Meltdown: Lessons for Central Bankers. San Francisco, CA: Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco. 
2 Vasile, D., Sebastian, T. C., & Radu, T. (2011). A behavioral approach to the global financial crisis. 
Economic Science, 20(2), 340-346. 
3 Wray, L. R. (2015). Why Minsky matters: An introduction to the work of a maverick economist. Princeton 
University Press. 




Indeed, many of the actions taken to alleviate the consequences of the Minsky moment 
that caused the Wall Street meltdown that cascaded in late 2008 into 2009, namely in bailing out 
key industries, may have sparked a new era of risks receding from the mind of both investors and 
corporate boards. In fact, this is eminently reasonable in hindsight in the face of unprecedented 
assistance and accommodation from the Federal Reserve and a backstopping fiscal regime5, a 
coaxing to return to risk-on behavior to rouse the economy back to its feet about a decade ago 
may have helped in accumulating instability about a decade later.  
The ‘black swan event’ of the coronavirus was, of course, not readily foreseeable and, 
even if somewhat foreseeable given East Asia’s previous episodes with respiratory illness 
outbreaks and epidemics, its scope and scale of impact on the global economy was never before 
seen. Further, the event did not mark a financial crisis of the proportions seen in 2008 as it did 
not overly impact the financial or banking sectors specifically6. Indeed, the rapid action from 
central bankers in propping up credit markets and curbing cascading defaults, innovative fiscal 
action was largely effective despite early alarm bells and still significant economic drawdowns7. 
These actions, coupled with some of the safeguards put in place in the wake of the Great 
Recession and a host of other, more minor factors, were crucial in preventing a larger crisis.  
However, there were many industries and specific firms within certain industries that 
were not as insulated as the banking sector and, in many cases, had ultimately helped to create a 
situation under which either significant assistance, loans, and paycheck protection8 was 
 
5 Bartsch, E., Boivin, J., Fischer, S., & Hildebrand, P. (2019). Dealing with the next downturn: From 
unconventional monetary policy to unprecedented policy coordination. Macro and Market Perspectives. 
6 Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Pedraza, A., & Ruiz Ortega, C. (2020). Banking sector performance during the 
covid-19 crisis. Demirguc-Kunt A, Pedraza A, Ruiz-Ortega C. Banking Sector Performance During the 
COVID-19 Crisis. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 9363. 
7Granja, J., Makridis, C., Yannelis, C., & Zwick, E. (2020). Did the Paycheck Protection Program Hit the 




necessitated, but even full-scale bailouts akin to those offered in 2008’s Minsky moment. In this 
case, it was not complex derivatives ballooning bets or unsafe loan practices, but a self-fulfilling 
crescendo of share repurchase programs that chased a seemingly never-ending bull market in 
equities as even the world’s largest and most respected hedge-funds declared an end to market 
cycles9.  
With this in mind, many firms and their boards signed off on unparalleled levels of share 
buybacks on the belief that share prices would continue to rise, which in a somewhat perverse 
manner was self fulfilling given the dynamics of open-market share repurchases. In fact, share 
buybacks reached such a fever pitch never before seen in 2019, shortly before the coronavirus 
shook the balance sheets of many companies, private and publicly traded alike. In many cases, 
these buybacks were even financed on the back of debt10, further illustrating the issue of these 
non-additive capital allocations. More importantly, the logic of utilizing debt to chase higher 
returns via share repurchases is directly analogous to the ponzi finance behavior examined by 
Minsky in the financial sector.  
In essence, the climate of easy money instigated by the Federal Reserve, a risk-on mood 
promoted by fiscal policymakers, and irrational exuberance amidst the longest bull market in 
modern history made for an epic March drawdown that, despite its brevity, brought home the 
idea that capital preservation retains a place in responsible corporate governance. This was 
especially highlighted as significant governmental action barely saved thousands of firms, often 
operating within critical industries, from bankruptcy. In order to understand this idiosyncratic 
 
9 Kumar, Nishant (2020, Jan. 11), “Bridgewater Co-CIO Bob Prince Says Boom-Bust Cycle Is Over”. 
Bloomberg. 
10 Cox, Jeff (2019, July 29) “Companies are ramping up share buybacks, and they’re increasingly using 




cycle, Minsky might yet have another lesson to apply in terms of this underlying factor of share 
repurchases and their capacity to undermine the stability of so many firms so as to threaten the 
overall economy. The prescient insights he offers could well be extremely pertinent to preventing 
such problematic ponzi behavior in the future.  
As such, this paper will offer further evidence of the pro-cyclical nature of stock 
buybacks that align with the idea of the destabilizing nature of stability. In doing so, the paper 
will offer granular examples of this behavior with attention to specific firms and industries that 
counted themselves among the most distressed in the immediate aftermath of COVID-19 
economic shutdowns. 
 In reviewing these test cases, the expected pro-cyclical nature of buybacks was 
confirmed, along with correlative evidence in the buybacks promoting increased short term share 
prices, particularly around earnings releases. Still, conjecture does remain on the magnitude of 
this impact, both in broader index moves and the individual test cases. Finally, reviews of the test 
cases of firms, as well as the industry case of airlines, indicate that lawmakers extended larger 
loans and grants to firms that had both spent heavily on buybacks and found themselves heavily 
indebted. In contrast to what might be expected, the market cap, employee count, and market 
share of the airlines appeared to play a smaller role in decisions to extend larger grants to each 
carrier. As such, the paper offers both a cautionary note to corporate governors pursuing 
increased share buybacks into extended market cycles, while also offering regulators and 
lawmakers a review of perhaps overlooked factors in the distribution of bailout-like programs. 
A. Literature Review 
While there will be periodic mention of specific literature pertinent to each of the 
subsequent subsections of this paper, it is worthwhile to offer a brief overview of some of the 
 
 
more pertinent pieces of research present at the moment and the areas where this research will be 
additive.  
Much of the existing literature on Minsky focuses solely on the financial crisis and the 
more obvious ponzi behavior found in the mortgage industry prior to the crisis, e.g. Wray11, or in 
terms of business cycles broadly, e.g. Palley12 and Davis13, or market signaling on buyback 
announcements, e.g.  While large scale empirical data has been explored with great detail, most 
notably by Pedrosa14. However, far less focus has been honed into specific firm and industry 
level, nor has a great deal of focus been specifically directed upon buybacks and the underlying 
behavioral dynamics of this specific behavior. 
Similarly, the research that touches upon the topic of buybacks, that is understandably 
multitudinous in the wake of increasing share repurchases in recent years, deals with the impact 
on share prices and potential benefits, e.g. Asness15, or the potential uses for free cash aside from 
piling it into a company’s own stock, e.g. Lazonick16. On the former, I will review and display 
the mechanistic fashion in which open market share repurchases artificially improve earnings 
ratios that are used as important metrics in valuing a stock, while also reducing dilution that 
might adversely affect share price. While there is heated debate on the long term effects as well 
as the necessary use of programs in certain instances, particularly in terms of share dilution, the 
 
11 Wray, L. R. (2015). Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis and the endogeneity of money. Financial 
conditions and macroeconomic performance: essays in honor of Hyman P. Minsky, 161-180. 
12 Palley, T. I. (2011). A theory of Minsky super-cycles and financial crises. Contributions to Political 
Economy, 30(1), 31-46. 
13 Davis, L. E., De Souza, J. P. A., & Hernandez, G. (2019). An empirical analysis of Minsky regimes in 
the US economy. Cambridge journal of economics, 43(3), 541-583. 
14 Pedrosa, Í. (2019). Firms’ leverage ratio and the Financial Instability Hypothesis: an empirical 
investigation for the US economy (1970–2014). Cambridge journal of economics, 43(6), 1499-1523. 
15 Asness, C., Hazelkorn, T., & Richardson, S. (2018). Buyback derangement syndrome. The Journal of 
Portfolio Management, 44(5), 50-57. 
16 Lazonick, W. (2014). “Profits Without Prosperity: Stock Buybacks Manipulate the Market and Leave 




mechanistic effect is sufficient to prove an incentive, particularly for short-term focused 
corporate boards. Additionally, there have been multiple analyses of the signaling effect of 
buybacks, through numerous methods of regression which will be discussed at length later in this 
paper. 
On this point, my contribution to the discussion will be most notable in examining the 
correlation between firm stability and the issue of debt utilized to finance buybacks. While this 
topic has been recognized in professional literature at the broader industry level, e.g. by the IMF, 
firm level dissection and corporate behavior has not received significant attention aside from 
analyst notes and investment theses from major banks. Academic literature has been decidedly 
more broad. Additionally, expertise from a journalistic perspective in covering firm level activity 
through the lens of managers and retail investors has largely been left unexplored as of yet.  
Lastly, given the recency of the COVID-19 crisis and its sudden impact on financial and 
specifically upon equity markets there is not a great deal of literature examining the factors that 
exacerbated the downturn provoked by the pandemic. As such, there is tremendous opportunity 
to contribute meaningfully to factors necessitating bailouts of numerous companies and its 
mirroring of understood dynamics such as Minsky’s work, namely in buybacks, and guidance on 
impact for corporate governance and indeed governments digging into fiscal coffers to prop up 
destabilized businesses in future. That said, on the point of bailouts there is already quite a 
wealth of literature assessing the immediately visible efficacy of certain bailout programs, which 
will be utilized at length in the later sections of the paper. 
2. Making Sense of Minsky’s Insights 
 It would be nonetheless remiss if Minsky’s key insights into financial stability and the 
financial sector were not addressed at least in some detail, as shifting them to the present day 
 
 
without prior context would be uncouth. Minsky, in observing the cycle of behavior, particularly 
in the financial sector, noted that bubbles based on anomalous behavior was perhaps a misnomer. 
Minsky instead argued that protracted eras of stability were ultimately destabilizing in and of 
themselves, often pacifying concerns to the point that risks are not recognized17.  
It is important to distinguish this from typically noted “bubbles” that are usually confined 
to specific sectors or can be explained away by numerous alternative explanations, including the 
popular idea of “irrational exuberance”18 in the moment itself. In this case, the proximate cause 
is most often called into question, as it offers a culprit for a crisis and therefore some solace in its 
explanation. 
In contrast, Minsky notes that the destabilizing effects of long-term moderation are 
endemic and create a situation by which behavior that is in hindsight irrational and unsustainable 
(ponzi), is readily justified in real time19. That is certainly not to say that certain bubbles can 
appear and exacerbate the endemic issue, as was seen in the situation of the arguable over-
securitization of mortgages and the housing bubble of 200820. Instead, it is to say that even those 
actions that create a placid economic environment for an extended period of time are in 
themselves destabilizing due to their seemingly unavoidable effect on risk appetite which 
gradually shifts along the risk curve under Minsky’s conception. This moves from hedge finance, 
the safest, towards speculation and ultimately toward the final stage of ponzi finance at the 
avaricious extreme. 
 
17 Wray, L. Randall (2008). Financial markets meltdown: What can we learn from Minsky?, Public Policy 
Brief, No. 94, ISBN 978-1-931493-75-8, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Annandale-on-
Hudson, NY 
18 Shiller, R. J. (2015). Irrational exuberance: Revised and expanded third edition. Princeton university 
press. 
19 ibid 
20 Wray, L. Randall (2008) : Financial markets meltdown: What can we learn from Minsky?, Public Policy 




Generally speaking, this dynamic takes time to manifest itself, most notably in the ‘Great 
Moderation’ that, despite bubble bursts like that on1987’s “Black Monday”21, the Russian Ruble 
Crisis22 and subsequent collapse of Long Term Capital Management23, and the Dot Com 
Bubble24, was an epoch characterized by steadily increasing asset prices and placid overall 
economic conditions. The time it took to breed the ‘destabilizing stability’ that Minsky speaks of 
was no sudden act. Arguably, the entirety of Alan Greenspan’s time atop the Federal Reserve, no 
doubt helped by his eager exercise of repo markets25,  was a time marked by low inflation, 
largely low unemployment, and, importantly for our observations, little need for major market 
intervention by government or Federal Reserve forces, outside of the immediate aftermath of 
9/1126.  
While one might feel compelled to argue that the Dot-Com bubble was an early signal 
that the prolonged era of stability was fueling undue speculation and thus instability ala Minsky’s 
predictions, this episode is much more akin to Shiller’s writings on irrational exuberance and the 
much-feared atmosphere of euphoria in markets. The novelty of internet firms is an idiosyncratic 
example and does not reach the structural levels that Minsky writes of. Further, the listing of 
companies with no tangible revenue or profits, nor even a path to profitability in many cases, was 
never stable to begin with. In this case, almost no rational players were “lulled to sleep” as you 
might glean from Minsky’s ideas, but instead were either irrationally exuberant or happily 
 
21 Bogle, J. C. (2008). Black Monday and black swans. Financial Analysts Journal, 64(2), 30-40. 
22 Desai, P. (2000). Why did the Ruble collapse in August 1998?. American Economic Review, 90(2), 48-
52. 
23 Jorion, P. (2000). Risk management lessons from long‐term capital management. European financial 
management, 6(3), 277-300. 
24 Ofek, E., & Richardson, M. (2003). Dotcom mania: The rise and fall of internet stock prices. The 
Journal of Finance, 58(3), 1113-1137. 
25 Miller, M., Weller, P., & Zhang, L. (2002). Moral Hazard and The US Stock Market: Analysing the 
‘Greenspan Put'. The Economic Journal, 112(478), C171-C186. 
26 Kim, H., & Gu, Z. (2004). Impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the return and risk of airline stocks. 
Tourism and Hospitality Research, 5(2), 150-163. 
 
 
dancing to the market rhythm while believing in their ability to time exactly when the music 
would stop playing. Finally, it is crucial to notice that the damage done by the recession 
emanating from this asset bubble burst was quite minor. 
Instead, the real blow-off in what was termed a “Minsky Meltdown” by former Federal 
Reserve Chair Janet Yellen was clearly present in the Great Financial Crisis27. The crucial added 
detail to the already established overoptimism that can lead to vice in terms of added risk is the 
amplification of risk through the use of debt. As Yellen herself noted, the Great Recession was in 
large part a tale of investors chasing returns at the cost of liquidity28. In the words of Neuberger 
Berman Managing Director Steve Liesman, investors “mistook leverage for genius”29. 
For Minsky, the true crisis comes not simply once there is overeager and undue risks 
taken by market participants, but once this behavior manifests itself in debt financing of such 
undue behavior. This is because the behavior of debt financing speculation can only continue 
insofar as market dynamics continue favorably and support continuous asset inflation to sustain 
 
27 Yellen, J. L. (2009, April). Minsky Meltdown: Lessons for Central Bankers. San Francisco, CA: Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco. 
28 ibid 








In terms of lenders and borrowers this is relatively straightforward, and a perfect corollary  
is offered in the combustion of the mortgage industry in the United States in 2008.  
However, the same behavioral pattern is identifiable not only within the mortgage 
industry, but more broadly in the ills of certain market dynamics, not least with the behavior of 
many financial institutions that securitized and overplayed their bets on such complex 
instruments30. Nor did the behavior that marked the era and its eventual exclamation point die in 
the crisis itself. Indeed, the actions that propped up the market recovery and promoted a return to 
risk-on behavior that would return the economy to its feet may have yet encouraged another 
 
30 Stout, L. A. (2011). Derivatives and the legal origin of the 2008 credit crisis. Harv. Bus. L. Rev., 1, 1. 
 
 
epoch of undue risk taking under Minsky’s conceptions, albeit in another arena of corporate 
behavior. 
Indeed, a miraculous economic comeback that came to undergird the longest bull market 
for equities in modern history was not just jump-started by accomodative monetary policy and 
supportive fiscal policy, but by a rapid pick up in the already building trend of stock buybacks by 
corporate boards that aided in inflating asset prices. In terms of market mechanics, this created 
an environment by which publicly traded firms fueled their own overconfidence which was 
echoed by Wall Street and retail investors alike, chasing almost self-fulfilling hopes for increased 
returns.  
Crucially, in many cases this overconfidence in a firm’s own share price appreciation was 
underwritten by debt, increasing instability in the market overall in the same fashion forecast 
under Minsky’s guidelines. In this sense, the slow roll of speculative share repurchase programs 
gradually moved towards the ponzi end in a significant subsection of US firms at precisely the 
wrong time, as the coronavirus pandemic decimated demand in short order across countless 
industries. In this sense, countless industries came calling for bailouts that otherwise could have 
been provided for by unnecessary spending on buybacks and, to a lesser extent, dividends, that 
offer little to the overall firm’s health outside of the expected dynamic of steadily increasing 
asset prices. 
In short, this moves in tandem with Minsky’s expectations through a tangential avenue, 
as the certainty in economic stability in the form of steady share price appreciation this fueled 
speculation that emptied the coffers of companies of otherwise buttressing balance sheets and, in 
the worst cases, fueled the ponzi behavior of taking out loans in order to finance share 
repurchase programs that would only prove sustainable should share prices continue to 
 
 
appreciate at rapid rates, ad infinitum. The logic of the overall observations remain eminently the 
same. 
3. The Buyback Build Up 
 However, there are subtle differences that augment the precise behavioral dynamics that 
form the conceptions of Minsky’s financially focused work. On the issue of buybacks, it is 
important to first illustrate the dynamics of share buybacks, their purposes, and to ultimately 
recognize their impact on share prices and how the process of authorizing large scale buyback 
programs in itself creates a sort of hazard.  
 The rationale for a share buyback program is by no means nefarious immediately, as an 
effort on behalf of a board to reinvest in itself is admirable in many ways. Indeed, it signals the 
confidence of management that shares are undervalued and that the company is in better shape 
than the market is recognizing and therefore reinvesting will pay off for the company in the long 
run31. Further, there are certain tax advantages, share dilution counteractions, and diminished risk 
as compared with other investment schemes, such as new research and development32. 
 Further, there is a crucial distinction in which buybacks one is discussing. Historically, 
tender offers, a program under which a company offers to purchase shares from existing 
shareholders at a specific, preset price have held an important place. This can be done in order to 
concentrate ownership and control the direction of a company33. These repurchase programs are 
clearly designed with ownership and management issues in mind and therefore do not closely 
 
31 Van Rixtel, A., & Villegas, A. (2015). Equity issuance and share buybacks. Bank of International 
Settlements. 
32 ibid 
33 Lazonick, W. (2014). “Profits Without Prosperity: Stock Buybacks Manipulate the Market and Leave 
Most Americans Worse Off.” Harvard Business Review. 
 
 
follow the dynamics and ills described by Minsky Similarly, .fixed-price tender offers, Dutch 
auction tender offers, and transferable put right distributions, and targeted stock repurchases do 
not necessarily fit appropriately into this category. 
Instead, the dominant modus operandi among US firms in open market repurchase 
programs that have quickly come into vogue are very much in line with these designs. As no pre-
set price is pre-agreed and no pre-announcement necessarily communicated to shareholders 
ahead of a broad notification, these programs have immediate repercussions in terms of company 
earnings and share prices. This is largely a result of  the total shares available after such open 
market programs necessarily becoming scarcer and the demand therefore outweighing supply34. 
Given the size of many buyback programs for publicly traded firms, this is no small detail, 
especially in the short term.  
 The idea of making shares more scarce can immediately increase share prices from the 
simple dynamic that demand for shares increases while supply wanes. However, it need not even 
be so direct to have a large impact.  Most notably, an open market repurchase program ahead of 
an earnings report is an easy way to improve the image of a firm. This is because such a program 
increases the amount of earnings per share, simply due to the fact that the amount of shares 
outstanding serves as the denominator in the equation below.  
 
𝐸𝑃𝑆 =  (𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 –  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠) /𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 
 
Therefore, a firm’s quarterly reports, as far as bottom line results, are improved and are 






and mirrors, as the company must spend to purchase these outstanding shares which also has its 
own requisite effects, it often promotes sanguinity among investors and analysts who generally 
appreciate stocks that are able to consistently meet or beat estimates36. Of course, analysts 
themselves are quite savvy and many will utilize more nuanced models that must take into 
account numerous other factors, including taxation and other impactful factors. Nonetheless, as 
McKinsey studies indicate, there is very much ways to maneuver the figures in order to increase 
not only earnings per share, but indeed share price37.  
Balance Sheet Before ($) After ($) 
Buying back $200m of Shares Scenario 




Total Assets 780 580 
Exhibit 238 
 
This impact is only amplified when accounting for tax impacts, as buybacks offer 
significant tax benefits, especially following the most recent tax reform in the United States39. 
However, the discussion of taxation of buybacks as compared to dividends remains a topic of 
 
36 Almeida, H., Fos, V., & Kronlund, M. (2016). The real effects of share repurchases. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 119(1), 168-185. 
37 Dobbs, Richard (2005) “The Value of Share Buybacks”. McKinsey Quarterly. 





much debate, notably with analyses suggesting equalization of tax rules might go quite a ways to 
quelling the overwhelming preference for buybacks40. 
 
Income Statement Before After 
EBIT 134 134 
Interest 6 0 
Taxes -42 -40 
Net Income 98 94 
Shares Outstanding 100 86.5 
Share Price ($) 14.8 15 
EPS 1 1.09 
Exhibit 341 
Nonetheless, it is apparent from the base cases laid out by McKinsey, there is no increase 
in the value of a company even in terms of earnings before interest and taxes are included and 
the actual equity value of the company is reduced via share repurchases. Further, there is a 
decrease in net income despite a respite from some extra taxes. The loss in net income is additive 
to the issue of removed safety cushion and flexibility provided by a cash cushion, reflected in the 
25% reduction in the balance sheet in the form of cash. However, the effect that is seen in terms 
 
40 Hemel, D. J., & Polsky, G. D. (2021). Equalizing the Tax Treatment of Stock Buybacks and Dividends. 
Available at SSRN 3827117. 
41 Author’s rendering of information compiled: Dobbs, Richard (2005). “The Value of Share Buybacks”. 
McKinsey Quarterly. 
 Data assumes cost of equity at 10%, cost of debt at 3%, and growth at 5% 
 
 
of tax penalty and in the number of outstanding shares pushes upward both the share price and 
the earnings per share figures. Indeed, this example is exceedingly modest and conservative, as 
the actual analyses of share price increases, including those done by Two Sigma and other 
respected investment firms42 that estimate the impact much higher. Indeed, even without the tax 
incentives factored in, it is likely that the share price has the potential to immediately increase as 
well, at least in the immediate term. 
This heavily incentivizes buybacks that, coupled with the idea that management is 
confident in share appreciation that emanates through market sentiment, helps drive some share 
appreciation without actually improving the company or driving any organic growth or 
reinvestment in labor, etc.43 In a sense, money is being reinvested into a company that is not 
actually reinvesting in anything other than its own share price and the benefit of lessened 
taxation on held assets. Of course, this is not a sustainable model of business and often rewards 
executive stock-correlated salaries in an outsized manner44. Further, as was established earlier, 
there is a signaling that is correlated in share repurchase announcements and a further 
amplification of share price appreciation upon quarterly earnings announcements that continue to 
meet Wall Street's expectations. As the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 only amplified this effect 
in terms of tax shields45, the manipulation of earnings per share and share prices has only been 
amplified, much to the chagrin of healthier balance sheets and more wary investors. 
 However, this is still a good investment from the perspective of management should 
share prices continue to increase, as the company’s own investment in itself will be rewarded and 
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the short term price appreciation begets a more accommodating voice from Wall Street. If such a 
program is employed opportunistically, it is a fantastic way to raise capital quickly and thereafter 
reinvest in the company itself, through such avenues as the aforementioned research and 
development. More importantly, it is indeed a great way to reward shareholders if used 
effectively and appropriately and, most of all, with some sense of opportunism when shares are 
actually undervalued rather than merely as a crutch.  
 The major problem with the strategy lies in the relatively widespread use of such 
programs in an inopportunistic fashion and the underlying incentives associated with it. Indeed, 
the potential for financial engineering and manipulation has been historically recognized, making 
the rise in buybacks a uniquely modern phenomenon. Indeed, until 1982 the topic of share 
repurchases provoked apprehension in board rooms as it subjected companies to scrutiny from 
the Securities and Exchange Commission who frowned upon such activity as stock 
manipulation46. Prior to the institution of this rule, dividends were the most utilized manner by 
which to return capital to shareholders, utilizing excess cash in order to do so. After the 
introduction of the safe harbor provision in 1982, dividends fell out of favor gradually.  
 






 The dynamic is notable as it shows a gradual changing of the guard in waves, but also 
because of the differing dynamics in how dividends affect the share price. Returning to the 
simple numerator and denominator of the share buyback, the dividend imparts the opposite 
effect. Dividends actually increase the amount of shares outstanding, which reduces the incentive 
to pursue them for the purposes of engineering that have been noted. As such, the implications of 
dividends are to provide shareholders value without necessarily “gaming the system”, in fact to 
the contrary. Similarly, dividends are a far more consistent form of payouts historically, as the 
maintenance of a dividend over a long period of time is crucial to investors focused on dividend 
strategies. Share repurchases, given their opportunistic nature, are far more volatile and therefore 
given to short-termism much more than decades-long established dividend programs. 
 




To be sure, repurchases are preferable in that they are able to distribute excess cash more 
tax-efficiently than dividends, particularly after recent tax reform in the United States, aid in 
controlling effects of employee stock options, and offer more flexibility for firms. boost 
liquidity. Therefore, the growth in popularity might not be readily met with suspicion. Indeed, in 
context, there might be good reason as to why buybacks have become a dominant aspect of the 
corporate strategy among S&P 500 firms, especially in the years following the financial crisis. 
 
48 Data aggregated from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, S&P. Accounts for equity issuances, which 
also highlights higher flexibility. 
 
 
Exhibit 6 49 
 This should be of concern to those monitoring the overall stability of firms, as the shift to 
buybacks is perhaps motivated by this incentive to engineer somewhat, sacrificing some capital 
that might act as a bulwark on the balance sheet in pursuit of inorganic financial results. This can 
quickly snowball as it does not provide the check and balance that is seen in the review of 
dividend dynamics, previously pre-eminent among shareholder return packages. On the back of 
this behavioral incentive is the fact that the total amount of firms pursuing buyouts has not only 
dwarfed the prior institution of dividends, but has become a significant strategy added to firms 
continuing to pursue dividends in order to further placate a hungry shareholder base that has 
come to expect such reward over the span of time since 1982. 
Indeed, scholars have studied the topic of buyback effects on share mechanics since that 
initial legal shift extensively, both with regards to dividends and on policy more broadly. Notable 
research includes Barclay and Smith’s review of dividends50 versus buyback mechanics as 
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already discussed and Wiggins’ analysis of liquidity impacts51, among others. Even in the first 
decade after the rule change, there was notice among many academics that the newly 
unconstrained mechanism was augmenting the bid-ask spreads on publicly traded stocks. While 
some debate persisted about the actual effect, and particularly about the magnitude of the effect 
when compared to the previously more popular tender offers, there was an effect on the bid-ask 
spread and therefore the immediate share price in nearly every analysis52. While major empirical 
studies like that conducted by Ikenberry, et. al53 suggest that the reaction may be overestimated, 
there is still a noticeable effect that specifically reflects the signaling effect of undervaluation 
around repurchase announcements and thus their usefulness to corporate management.  
However, the phenomena of surging buybacks is even more recent than the initial 
regulatory allowance and long term trends emanating from 1982 would suggest and post-dates 
the noted research exploring the topic from the nineties. According to recent studies about 70% 
of total historical buyback activity has come since the Great Recession, reaching a crescendo to 
the extent that about half of all activity came in the five years prior to 202054. While the lead up 
to the financial crisis saw a serious boom in buybacks, the time since the 2009 nadir has been 
unparalleled, eclipsing that prior record easily55, topping metrics in terms of usage of free cash 
and even beyond use of available case, a topic that will be revisited later.  
In line with the issues of stability cited in Minsky’s work and the behavioral corollary 
cited thus far, the rationale for the recent surge might not be rooted in the most becoming 
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incentives. Perhaps most dubious among these is the conjecture among many, not least of which 
is former Harvard professor William Lazonick, that a large impetus behind such programs is a 
desire to meet thresholds for stock option grants that boards utilize to pay executives56. This is 
not merely a hyperbolic prescription of dubious motives to executives either, as a report from the 
SEC itself noted a consistent pattern of cashouts among executives upon announcements of share 
buyback plans that would requisitely provoke a positive market reaction57. The evidence of 
market reaction will be revisited in more depth, along with case studies on the signaling, later 
within this paper. 
 That said, it is the latter factor that is the ultimate catalyst, i.e.  the ability of these 
announcements to provoke such a reaction that then baits board and executives onward to 
increase authorizations and chase the sustained rally in equities. Further,  the actions appeared to 
ease investor concerns about appropriate capital preservation. While the rationale cited is by no 
means universal or univariate, its rationale has correlational evidence and, crucially, is in line 
with the dynamics predicted by Minsky’s hypothesis as it relates to lending practices.  
  Additionally, this is apparently a risk to stability recognized by regulators, as the 
Federal Reserve itself issued a moratorium on stock buybacks among banks in its system in 2020 
to alleviate such a risk58. In the report from the US central bank, the board noted that a majority 
of firms reduced buyback programs to near zero from a previous fever pitch, citing the 
“uncertainty in the economic environment” as the catalyst to curb unnecessary expenditure59 and 
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negatively impact capital position. As such, the board restricted share repurchases among banks 
to similarly act as a bulwark against any added risk to the overall financial system. In fact, it was 
the first recommendation of the board, which also noted the elevation in share repurchase and 
dividend distribution prior to the coronavirus crisis that shook equity prices and threatened to 
make such programs pay quite the opposite of dividends for the firms pursuing such strategies60. 
In short, the health of the banking system stood to be affected negatively by repurchases to the 
extent that they were banned by the central bank of the United States as a primary step after 
stress testing.  
Therefore, the risk to balance sheets specifically, and systemically as the Federal Reserve 
suggests, is evident and, arguably, a larger concern than the oft-examined issue of opportunity 
costs associated with these programs. 
4. Buybacks Abet the Bull Run? 
However, while the overall stability idea is important and a crucial aspect that will be 
revisited in later chapters of this thesis, the trajectory of the behavioral corollary must be 
established as well. On this aspect, the evidence over time in terms of the buildup in buyback 
programs has already been established. However, there is a larger question of whether this has 
itself abetted the longest bull market run for equities over this specific and unprecedented period 
and, if it has, to what extent.  
Indeed, the explosion in buybacks was accompanied a similarly unparalleled bull market 
run in equities, suggesting a degree of correlation in the behavior of executive boards who might 





promised returns under the illusion of a new paradigm in stability provided by evermore 
aggressive policymakers. Perhaps additive in effect is the dominance of passive investors in the 




The question of whether the buybacks promoted continued share appreciation, as longer 
term engineering is certainly difficult to maintain, or if many buyback authorizations were 
simply chasing the market as it lifted off from the ashes of the financial crisis62. 
Of course, at first, a simple superficial glance would give one the impression of 
correlation, especially in S&P 500 returns that rose rather consistently, alongside buybacks, in 
the recovery from the Great Financial Crisis. 
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Simply by raw dynamics, the rise in buybacks has been directly in tandem with the 
market cycle, indicating its pro-cyclical trend. This is not simply a trend seen in the last market 
cycle, but has been relatively consistent in the previous market expansions as well.  
Exhibit 863 
Most notably, share repurchases reached a fever pitch in the expansion from 2002 to 
2007 before arguably aiding in the implosion sparked by the mortgage crisis and more grossly 
ponzi behavior in derivatives surrounding that industry. Nonetheless, despite its at best 
peripheral contribution to 2008’s cataclysm, the peak of the crisis was also the peak for buybacks 
until just prior to the coronavirus pandemic, a factor of fragility therefore worth noting as 
consistent.  
However, it moves beyond simply a superficial correlation, as statistics show that US 
corporations were themselves the market moves over the course of the decade. Indeed, large cap 
US companies distributed an average of 87% of their net income as dividends and buybacks in 
the decade after the Great Financial Crisis, about 15% above historical norms64. In fact, 
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according to Goldman Sachs research, corporations themselves embarking upon repurchase 
programs easily exhibited the highest net demand for US equities, piling about $5.6 trillion into 
their own shares through these programs, leaving a net demand of over $4 trillion in the decade.  
Exhibit 965 
In fact, across many sectors more was piled into share buybacks than firms made in profits over 
the course of that decade66.  
As might be expected given their pro-cyclical nature, the pullback in buybacks 
immediately followed with the market cycle as it entered recession in 2008 and remained muted 
throughout, missing actual undervaluation that might have been seized upon sans overaggressive 
buyback programs during the prior bull-run. The vast majority of buybacks are indeed pursued 
during the late stage of the cycle, as Minsky’s premonitions suggested. 
While Goldman’s report attempts to throw cold water on the idea of the market being 
buyback driven, it notes that buybacks are responsible for at least 11% of the overall compound 
 




annual growth seen over that time frame67. Even by these conservative estimates, that is not an 
entirely insignificant contribution, especially when put into the overall jump in equity valuations 
in absolute terms over the course of these years. However, it is indeed a conservative estimate 
from the financial institution given comparative reports from other banks and research houses. 
As a point of reference, Ned Davis Research, a research house that performed a thorough 
and dynamic analysis of the S&P 500 returns both with buybacks and excluding buybacks68. 
From this, the team found that the S&P value would have been 19% lower without buybacks at 
the close of 2018. Of course, there is an implicit assumption that the cash allocated to buybacks 
are not invested in other parts of the business or held as cash69. Still, even if dividends are 
pursued rather than buybacks, indices would have closed the year 10% lower than the record 
levels reached70. 
Regardless of the conjecture of mitigating factors and the total additive effect that 
buybacks promote, there is most certainly a dearth, if not an outright non-existence, of studies 
suggesting an insignificant effect of these programs. The conjecture is much more over the scale 
of the effect and mitigating factors that might enlarge or otherwise shrink the cumulative effect 
and whether or not it is ultimately a positive or negative impact on equity markets. As cited 
above, credible studies put the additive effect comfortably in the double digits, becoming the 
crucial buyer of equities that continue to push upward and expand multiples beyond what 
historical earnings growth would suggest is reasonable.  
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Case in Point 
The signaling impact that many corporate boards see is best demonstrated within a case 
study, both in terms of the signaling effect that has been alluded to upon an announcement and 
upon the actual pursuit of the purchases pre-announced. Signaling is a topic well discussed in the 
literature on a broader level, e.g.Wansley et al.71, Vermaelen72 , Baker et. al73, and  Tsetsekos et 
al.74. Many of these studies arrive at the same basic conclusion, that the posturing of these 
programs in terms of signaling that shares are undervalued aid in carrying investor confidence 
and provoke positive response among the investment community that is, typically, subsequently 
met with positive price action that is additive to the supply and demand dynamics of shares that 
undergird the mechanistic impact. 
The mechanistic effect of even buyback announcements becomes obvious when citing 
anecdotal examples, which notes the behavioral dynamics before repurchases are even pursued. 
According to high-tech hedge fund Two Sigma, the announcement of a buyback shows a positive 
market response, with excess returns just under 1% in the month immediately following a 
buyback announcement75. The data compiled by the firm also noted a bifurcation in share 
buyback dynamics between time frames prior to and following the Great Financial Crisis.  
Crucially for the purposes of this paper, the buildup is weighted towards the late cycle as 
companies appear to increase their bullishness in buybacks pro-cyclically, which is indicative of 
Minsky’s finding on longer term returns and placidity in markets promoting more general 
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comfort with otherwise speculative behavior.  Indeed, buyback programs appear to only increase 
in line with broader market gains and amplify in late cyclewhen examined via multiple 
correlation tests. However, this also correlates with overall corporate debt levels since 2000, 
which will be revisited later. 
Exhibit 1076 
Incorporating multiple factors, from the direct, mechanistic shift in shrinking the amount 
of shares in circulation and thus improving earnings per share numbers on quarterly earnings 
announcements and maintaining an image of strength, to the more subjective signaling to the 
undervaluation of shares to an investment community which has proven to respond kindly to 
such announcements, there is certainly wiggle room to these estimates. The crucial detail is that 
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each analysis notes that these two effects in tandem have a not insignificant impact and one that 
many authorizing such actions can surely recognize. 
Again this is worthwhile to examine at a firm level to understand the board’s behavior in 
both announcing and pursuing share repurchase programs. 
 
Qualcomm 
One of the clearer uses of a buyback to signal strength that is ultimately illusory would be 
Qualcomm’s pursuit of a $30 billion buyback program after being denied the chance to acquire 
Dutch semiconductor competitor NXP Semiconductor by Chinese regulators77. This is a 
particularly strong sign of signaling because the move to authorize such an outsized share 
buyback program was explicitly done in order to shore up confidence in the company as it 
moved forward as a stand-alone entity. Indeed, there was well-founded fear among the board that 
there might be an activist investor issue should action not be taken to shore up the share price, 
especially as the firm dealt with lingering legal issues with Apple, whom it supplies chips to.  
Regardless of the minutia behind the decision to pursue the program, the move was a 
clearly effective signal sent by management in the immediate term. Indeed, beyond the 
immediate mechanistic effects that are shown as the supply of shares is thinned, the market 
clearly picked up on the signal as volume spiked on the announcement alone as well as the 
periodic updates provided by management. 
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 In fact, average daily volume spiked providing a just over 7% jump in share price over 
the course of two days ( pertinent given the announcement made at Pacific time and the trading 
day’s Eastern bias) and aided in promoting share appreciation of nearly 20% for the quarter. 
Otherwise, given the crash and burn of what would have been a blockbuster deal, one might have 
expected share prices to decline. Indeed, the large purchase appeared to reward the conviction of 
management, in contrast to some prior programs that had not worked quite as well.  
While the purchase thus appears opportunistic in this lens, as the appreciation in shares 
proved management’s judgment prescient, it creates a chicken and egg issue. As management 
was clearly attempting to promote confidence, their show of confidence may have been a self-
fulfilling signal to the market, as much of the existing literature argues. Further, it showed that a 
larger signal was key to generating the type of reaction that is desired in pursuing such a 
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program. Thereafter, management is encouraged to continue programs and indeed accelerate the 




Overall, this is not a major issue in principle. The main issue is the accelerated pace at 
which the buyback program was pursued and the weakened balance sheet left behind at a time 
when Qualcomm was in a situation where numerous risks still confronted it. After all, over $10 
billion remaining on the balance sheet retains a firm position amidst potential troubles, even if 
the buyback program might have been quite ambitious and out of character. 
Indeed, in prior years, Qualcomm’s pursuit of its buyback program might conform more 
with Minsky’s hedge finance definition, being careful not to overextend and maintain adequate 





above, the prior $5 billion and $10 billion programs authorized after the Great Financial Crisis 




Crucially, they allowed Qualcomm to continue to build capital to put toward investment, 
potential acquisitions, and other fruitful activities. By contrast, the more aggressive late cycle 
program actually reduced free cash to just one third of its prior peak and, in many instances. The 
reduction in cash, coupled with debts on the balance sheet even encouraged auditors to put 
warnings on 10-K filings following 2018, noting that the company’s large outstanding debt 
coupled with a reduced cash pile could be a concern large enough to threaten the overall business 
should conditions change in regards to the credit rating or operating conditions.  
 




Nonetheless, Qualcomm is a better example of how a large signal can abet a stock price’s 
ability to push higher as confidence exuded by management only adds to the mechanistic impact 
on share dynamics and trickles into the public investment psychology. In fact, it offers an 
example of how larger signals work more effectively and might beckon management to be more 
aggressive in future. Given the firm still sat atop billions on its balance sheet, it is by no means a 
poster child for ponzi behavior and likely merely falls on the low-end of the speculative stage of 
Minsky’s ideation. Still, despite the availability of cash to Qualcomm, many of the programs for 
share buybacks and maintenance of the firm’s dividend were financed by debt issuance, which is 
a subject that will garner more pointed attention later within this paper. In this regard, the seeds 





Overall the test case is very instructive, as one must recognize the firm level reaction over 
an extended bull market that would most certainly be picked up upon by executive management 
and corporate boards looking to beef up their share price, for whatever means. In the case of well 
capitalized firms or firms that are genuinely taking advantage of a market disconnect and 
undervaluation of shares, this is not necessarily a major issue. Yet, for the less fortified balance 
sheets, it does create an environment in which the blow of unexpected impacts, such as a sharp 
market downturn, especially in the case of the extreme, exogenous shock during the coronavirus 
crisis of 2020 cannot be sustained.  
In this sense, balance sheets that might have otherwise been a fortress if capital was 
preserved more carefully and held in order to be resilient to the challenges of macroeconomic, 
geopolitical, or medical cataclysm are weakened to the point that they become highly vulnerable 
to such events. In the latest case, to the point of insolvency.  Put more poetically, it is not the 
buybacks that broke the firms, but rather the thing that made them more fragile and thus 
susceptible to a solvency crisis in many cases. 
5. Imbalancing the Balance Sheet 
As has been hinted at, not least in the test cases, is that a major effect of overdone 
buyback programs is their proclivity to amplify downside effects and leave these companies 
pursuing programs with more diminished balance sheets, especially after pursuing buybacks at 
the most bullish rate near market tops. While prior to the financial crisis firms typically pursued 
buyback programs following large scale selloffs or were otherwise utilized to mute undue 
volatility in a share price and signal confidence, tht predictability has faded following the crisis. 
Indeed, data compiled by Two Sigma has shown that extended gains and stronger returns by 
shares over a two to three year period was actually much more highly correlated with the pursuit 
 
 





As such, corporations were shown to broadly chase positive returns rather than utilize 
buybacks to mute downside risk as had been the modus operandi in the past84. Similarly, the 
value stocks that had been traditionally targeted for buyback programs faded from the forefront 
of these programs, with firms apparently taking little heed of valuation and opportunism in 
repurchases that were more persistent in prior observed periods85. 
As is evidenced, buybacks serve as a significant backbone of company strategy, but can 
easily fall out of step with earnings and then run afoul of its intent to signal undervaluation. This 
suggests a sort of “buy high” behavior that is not conducive to the goal of the programs and the 
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oft-stated strategy of poaching undervalued shares. Indeed, buybacks peaked in early March, 
reaching their highest point prior to the 2018 rate hike cycle that stoked some concern on the 
practice86. Indeed, as shown by reported buybacks peaking in a quarter bookended by the largest 
pullback and most rapid in equity prices since the Great Financial Crisis, sparked by 
coronavirus’ forced closure of swaths of the global economy, buybacks can often peak at 
precisely the wrong time and then leave firms without proper capital on the balance sheet to 
actually take advantage of the recovery. In fact, to the more extreme consequence, many of the 
companies pursuing buybacks most aggressively within the confines of the protracted bull 
market were among the quickest to call for bailout programs from the government as they lacked 
a strong enough balance sheet to withstand a major crisis.  
Contrary to the pre-Great Financial Crisis era of share buybacks wherein share buybacks 
were utilized to mute volatility and opportunistically purchase shares after a short period of 
declines, the post crisis era has tempered this trend. Instead, many buybacks can follow strong 
performance in share prices rather than shoring up a share price amidst increased volatility or a 
significant selloff. Per multivariate regression analysis and logistic regressions on buyback 
announcements performed by Two Sigma, there were noticeably larger negative returns relative 
to average for the period before the Great Financial Crisis than thereafter87. 
In terms of Minsky’s point of view, the pro-cyclicality and increase in buyback programs 
is the process of moving from hedge programs towards speculative measures as the bull market 
seems to carry on. It would seem that the very persistent nature of price increases in shares of 
most companies continued in the post-crisis era, especially as accommodative Federal Reserve 
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and fiscal policy supported a protracted bull run, pushed many firms along the risk curve. In 
some cases, this created solvency issues in the wake of the coronavirus crisis that might have 
otherwise been averted. 
 Of course, the progression towards an imbalance balance sheet is also most visible on an 
anecdotal level. The broader data sets and tandem moves in buybacks alongside soaring equity 
returns, along with the aforementioned dynamics that establish these moves as correlated, are 
observed from a bird’s eye view, the important lessons in corporate governance are perhaps 
better gleaned from sector and, more pointedly, a firm-level perspective. 
Exhibit 1688 
 In observing the firms that were most eager to pursue buybacks, the Standard and Poor’s 
buyback index89, which sought to expressly take advantage of the aforementioned dynamics in 
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buybacks returns to shareholders, is an ideal place to start. Information and technology, an 
industry growing at a rapid pace, is well-represented in the compiled indices and maintains the 
largest share of buybacks over the decade, led by the overwhelming leader in share repurchases, 
Apple90. The massive level of buybacks within this sector most certainly jump-started the trend 
in tandem with the sector’s rapid ascent in share prices more broadly. This is significant to 
observe because the prior period in which information technology companies had led in both 
returns and buyback proclivity was shortly prior to the Dot Com Bubble91. 
Further, and crucially for the purposes of this review, many of these firms helped lead 
broader market  indices upward, fomenting an irrational continuation of evermore speculative 
programs as prices rose. Indeed, the S&P buyback index continually led the benchmark S&P 500 
index in terms of returns in the post-crisis period, notching consistent calendar-year returns 
above its benchmark. However, the index crucially amplified downturns and in the two years that 
it did not beat its benchmark, it amplified the losses significantly, displaying the volatility and 
potentially imbalancing effects of the programs. 
This was notable particularly among industrial companies which had lessened resilience 
to the downturn. Whereas technology companies may indeed benefit from many aspects of the 
pandemic’s effect on daily life, many industrial companies and other, less nimble or modern 
firms had less room to maneuver. Industrial companies are also among the firms most correlated 
with buybacks as a primary driver of their returns over the past decade, particularly those 
counting themselves as major Dow 30 components. The issue is that the debt levels among 
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industrial companies rose significantly in the period following the financial crisis along with the 
significant rise in buyback programs. 
Of course, many of these firms composing in the index eventually found themselves in 
crisis during the COVID-19 pandemic that necessitated governmental assistance. The latter will 
be scrutinized in greater detail later in this paper. Nonetheless, it is useful to observe firm level 
test cases and divine the Minsky-esque psychology that continually rising share prices and placid 
market conditions create, ultimately aiding in greater destabilization in the event of a crash 
catalyst coming to the fore. 
Case in Point 
Boeing Corporation 
 
 Boeing is a prime example of the correlative effect of buybacks in promoting stock 
prices, not only in terms of its own stock price, but its status as the largest Dow Industrials 
(DJIA) component by weight for a number of years following the financial crisis. As such, 
Boeing was an outsized market indicator that investors looked to, amplifying its share repurchase 
impact more broadly into the realm of investor psychology92. 
 





 Again, when compared with the chart of equity performance, the pro-cyclicality of such 
programs is readily visible, as is provided below courtesy of Nasdaq chart data and indeed, the 
comeback in share price seen in late 2020 into 2021 is in large part driven by a cash infusion to a 
balance sheet that had become bereft after pouring over $40 billion into buyback programs that 
proved a wise investment for a time, but ultimately left a balance sheet completely imbalanced. 
Indeed, this is a topic that will be revisited in more detail later in this paper. The crucial aspect to 
understand at this time is the correlation to stock performance, by way of the mechanistic movers 
already covered, and the self-fulfilling behavior this foments. 
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Additionally, when looking closer at the average cost per share of the program at its peak, 
late in the cycle, indicates further the pro-cyclicality of the program in Boeing’s case that was 
bade forward until a final point in which the share price plummeted. As such, the arguments 
about stabilizing volatility, taking advantage of undervaluation, and other ancillary arguments 
appear to not hold merit in the post Great Financial Crisis decade. 
The example of Boeing is also instructive because the buildup in buybacks was also 
largely unabated by crises with the products that Boeing itself produces, namely within its 
troubled 737 MAX 8 jets96. As Lazonick would have noted, the buyback programs that totaled 
over $40 billion in the course of the post-crisis decade came at the expense of the safety of its 
product, which caused two major crashes in late 2018 and early 2019. However, instead of 
cutting back on repurchase programs in order to address these key issues, the repurchase 
program was reinvigorated with the company authorizing a stunning $20 billion repurchase 
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program in December 2018, fueling a renewed rally in shares that defied potential debt issues 
that were exacerbated at the time by a tighter monetary policy pursued by the Federal Reserve. 
The late December signal did appear to assuage concerns in the first quarter of 2019, aiding in 
the share price’s push to an all-time high less than six months after a catastrophe.  
Also, the major repurchase program drained on the company’s cash balance, as reflected 
within the average purchase price of the buyback program denoted in company filings in the 
resurgent program.  
Exhibit 1997 
 
Indeed, the program proceeded despite many warnings of investment needed elsewhere, 
retreating only momentarily in the immediate aftermath of major events. In helping drain on the 
company, it propelled added concern over an unexpected reported net loss and a doubling of debt 
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reflected in the 10-K filing for the full year 2019. In essence, despite the alarm ringing that 
capital must be conserved and invested in shoring up a potential boondoggle for the balance 
sheet and company overall, the company turned to buybacks to signal confidence and maintain 
an elevated share price. Unfortunately for Boeing and its shareholders, the buybacks left the 
company unprotected from the near deathblow that COVID dealt the company and would send 
shares spiraling downward along with the company’s credit rating and debt to equity ratio98.  
In fact, it actually took two crashes and, eventually, a CEO replacement to finally rein in 
the program, after which the company quickly supplicated lawmakers for funds to continue 
business in strategically important areas. Lazonick may well argue that the money may have 
been better spent in improving the faulty aspects of their flagship products. However, Lazonick 
would not have noted the further issue of these planes becoming immediately liabilities on the 
balance sheet rather than assets as they had been counted, particularly as Boeing’s accounting 
took note of expected deliveries to come as it projected the annual cash flows.  
In the end, it would be the CARES Act assistance from the federal government, that 
totaled only slightly more than the cost of the decade’s share buybacks, that would save the 
company from having to take drastic action, potentially including bankruptcy. Indeed, the 
company ultimately requested $20 billion more than even their buyback programs over the past 
decade.  
In particular, the rapid decline in share price to below $100 per share in the aftermath of 
the COVID case reports in the US and shutdown of flights  laid bare the folly of the late cycle 
repurchases at such elevated share prices. Indeed, over $10 billion was spent on buybacks in the 
waning quarters of the bull market, with the $20 billion authorization suggesting caution was 
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truly thrown to the wind at precisely the wrong point in time. In the end, the company’s 
overstated bullishness on share price that had served as a reliable signal to investors for the better 
part of a decade had become a harbinger of fragility that only a bailout could sustain before 
ultimately breaking the balance sheet, a topic that will receive scrutiny later within the paper. 
6. Self-Dealing Debt 
 
While Boeing did eventually imbalance itself and avoided dutiful  maintenance of cash 
and expenditure on its flagship business’ significant issues, it did not often do so directly through 
debt issuance. Therefore, the example best fits within the stage of speculation that portends the 
move to a final and most dangerous stage. In this case, the final stage is reflected in persistent 
debt issuance to fund a firm’s appetite for its own shares. As we can see in the financial crisis, 
this balloon can be popped by simple rising interest rates. In this instance, it would be a more 
extreme exogenous shock that revealed an unhealthy habit. 
Essentially, as lenders do under the auspices of Minsky’s writings in terms of lending 
being predicated upon ever-increasing asset prices, so too did firms borrow under the impression 
of continually increasing share prices. Under these premises, the debt could only be paid off if 
share prices continued to increase, which to some extent was something that the corporate boards 
themselves were attempting to kickstart through such programs. As such, the programs were 
essentially ponzi in nature, predicated on a bull market that would continue to run (often with 
their help as established in earlier chapters) and therefore make the debt issued worthwhile. As 
we now know, that was an irrational and unsustainable strategy for corporate governors that was 
eventually imploded in early 2020. 
 
 
In terms of the two dominant trends of the post-crisis era, certainly corporate debt and 
buybacks align99. In the decade after the financial crisis, corporate debt issuance increased 
threefold, moving upward in tandem with the aforementioned buildup of buyback programs100. 
Per data compiled by Bloomberg, 2017 saw an all-time high in debt-financed share buybacks, 
growing over 300 percent from its 2009 nadir alongside the similar increase in corporate debt101. 
Moreover, the peak of 2017 eclipsed the prior fervor that saw tech-focused firms piling into their 
own shares as share prices soared prior to the dot com bust102, a prior peak of leverage that saw 
many firms fall into insolvency thereafter. 
 Indeed, the current ratio, which measures the current assets over liabilities, continually 
rose in the post-crisis era among major energy and industrial companies and remains elevated as 
the coronavirus effects persist103. As of early 2021, the current ratio among major indices 
remained at near historic highs. Indeed, the debt levels of major firms and index leaders, like the 
aforementioned Boeing, ballooned significantly in just one decade.   
Just a few points of reference, 3M saw its debt levels accelerate from just $1 billion in 
2010 to $17 billion at the close of 2019, Exxon Mobil saw its debt skyrocket alongside ailing oil 
prices to nearly $50 billion from just $6.6 billion about a decade prior, and Occidental Petroleum 
increased its debt, largely through aggressive buybacks and M&A action, 14.5 times over. In 
each case, the buyback programs and dividend distributions continued despite such stark figures 
flooding the balance sheet. In many cases, these buybacks and payouts persisted despite credit 
downgrades, as a peak of low-credit quality debt issuance pervaded the bond market. 
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In fact, in another callback to a market catastrophe, the capital allocated to share 
buybacks among large cap companies in the United States exceeded free cash flow generation 
among these firms just prior to the Coronavirus crash105. The move past the 100% of free cash 
flow marker was the first time it had eclipsed that mark since 2007 and, in many cases, was 
pushed beyond this mark by company’s that were not cash flow generating in the first place 
towards the later end of the cycle106. 
In fact, nonfinancial corporate debt reached a top as a percentage of GDP in 2019, with 
junk bonds also coming into vogue as the cycle continued107. As such, credit quality was 
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deteriorating across corporates while these very same companies went into debt in order to shore 
up equity prices. Clearly, this is not a sustainable corporate strategy. 
Cognizant of this trend, the International Monetary Fund noted that the trend of leveraged 
share repurchases, particularly among small and mid-cap public firms in the United States, was a 
primary concern of the overextension of business late into the bull market cycle108. 
This late cycle behavior contrasts sharply with the positive relationship between cash 
flow generation and buybacks that had been observable within the more virtuous stage of the 
expansion and much of the pre-crisis era and within many of the multivariate regressions and 
studies performed recently, many of which are cited within this study. Interestingly, the level of 
debt-driven buybacks would actually artificially peak among S&P 500 firms in 2017, as tax 
benefits would come to increase appetite for expenditure of operational cash and curtail some of 
the rampant debt spending seen. Still, it by no means ended the appetite to eat into balance sheets 
as much more cash was actually spent in the final years of the longest bull market in history. 
Paradoxically, it would appear to be the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, which spurred on 
even more buyback activity, actually helped in alleviating some of the debt issues that may have 
even exacerbated the issues already apparent109. The effect was largely driven by the repatriation 
of funds to the United States from abroad and a lessened tax expenditure that alleviated strain on 
utilization of cash110. Thus, firms readily deferred what might have been tax revenue to the 
government into repurchase plans at an even stronger pace111. Still, it must be noted that it does 
not account for the small and mid-cap firms that would paint a starker picture of remaining 
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leverage, as the chart only accounts for the S&P 500. Importantly, the leverage noted in the IMF 
paper also noted a growing level of leverage among smaller firms into the pinnacle of the market 
cycle, which would have presumably been followed by larger cap peers had the intervention of 
legislation not quelled the ample appetite for debt that these firms were clearly displaying. 
Indeed, the deterioration of credit quality noted by the IMF among these firms may have been a 
harbinger of broader effects to come as debt-funded payouts ballooned as the cycle extended. 
Per Yardeni Research, a Wall Street analysis firm, over half of stock buybacks amongst 
US firms were underwritten by debt by the tail end of the cycle112. However, it is worth noting 
that there is a wide range of conjecture on this point, with estimates of the total level of 
leveraged buybacks being precisely unknowable. Nonetheless, in line with the Minsky-like cycle 
noted, broader analyses of the correlation between high buyback proclivity and high leverage 
ratios is readily observable113 even within conservative studies. 
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 Much of the early research concerning the immediate effects of the shocks amidst 
the COVID-19 crisis assess leverage and buyback programs separately. However, given the 
tandem dynamics and the regressions performed in Farre-Mensa et. al115 in the leadup to the 
crash, perhaps this is a level of analysis missing a major contributing factor. In fact, Aramonte 
(2020)116, while it provides solid analysis of the immediate issues and the returns and recovery of 
firms based upon their leverage and buyback proclivity, it often separates the two out for the 
analysis section, particularly within the share recovery of the performance of shares from high-
buyback and high leverage firms. While it is not surprising that high leverage firms see their 
shares fall most dramatically in a liquidity event, the contribution of share buybacks to the 
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weakening of balance sheets and their further extension throughout the cycle is the crucial detail 
that is ultimately intrinsic to the trend. 
Still, there has been some significant work in providing regressions that show the 
important connection to debt as a main driver of share repurchases in the post-crisis period, 
notably due to loose money policies driven by the Federal Reserve that make this a reasonable 
decision on the part of many corporate managers. Notably, the Bank of France noted that the 
taking on of significant debt is a reasonable end to the cyclical nature of buyback programs that 
gradually become levered over the course of the cycle117. This is exacerbated in the most recent 
case due to the easy money policies of the Federal Reserve, which the paper explores at much 
greater length. While the central bank implications are worth exploring, the discontinuity 
regressions performed in the paper form a case that solidifies the link between leveraged share 
buybacks and the latter stages of the market cycle118.  
In terms of this paper’s purposes, the link is directly in line with the case studies that 
illustrate gradual imbalancing and the increased allocation to share buybacks to the point that the 
cycle concludes and they become untenable. 
Case in Point 
General Electric 
 
 While companies like Boeing have reasonable rationale for repurchases, particularly as 
the programs were largely fruitful in terms of promoting share price and prompting market 
participants to accept the confidence of management in share appreciation until its flaws in not 
 
117 Elgouacem, A., & Zago, R. (2019). Share buybacks, monetary policy and the cost of debt. Monetary 




allocating capital toward its products more diligently was finally exposed, many companies 
followed an even more distressing tact of “throwing good money after bad”.  Perhaps no 
company is as guilty of this as General Electric, another company that has classically been 
regarded as a broader market indicator. In this case, the troubled company is a perfect example of 
the dangers of utilizing debt to finance buybacks instead of allocating toward major concerns and 
ultimately arriving at a crisis point sans the cash to continue operating. 
 Before analyzing the leverage, GE is an important case in signaling utilized for precisely 
the wrong reason. Rather than to signal confidence, the troubled leadership of GE might best be 
described as attempting to regain the confidence of the market, which the market responded by 
simply not buying. In this case, it would be perhaps the psychology of executives themselves 
being manipulated by the signals contemporary firms are able to leverage and then seeking to 
join in rather than attend to ballooning debt and sizable issues in funding irrevocable pension 
obligations in GE’s case. 
 To be sure, the opening salvo of GE’s audacious announcement that it would buy back a 
stunning $50 billion worth of stock was met with a significantly positive market reaction. As was 
the case with Qualcomm and with the broader market reactions seen in the immediate term and 
medium-term through analyses like those done by Two Sigma and Ikenberry, increased trading 





Of course, the trading volume sparked a pickup in the share price, displaying what has already 
been noted in terms of the signaling power and furthermore the amplified reaction to more 
ambitious buyback programs. In fact, GE shares maintained their buoyancy for the ensuing 
weeks and months, finishing the quarter around the same share price as had been spurred by the 
announcement. The announcement in itself spiked shares upward nearly 300% of what had been 
their year to date gain as of the announcement as well, placating shareholders that might have 
otherwise urged management to provide more value. 
 





In terms of the timing over a more long term basis, however, it was not as opportunistic, 
coming at the tail end of a bullish period for the stock. While shares had climbed over 200% 
from their trough in 2009 at the point of the share buyback announcement, and leaped alongside 
the startlingly bold program’s disclosure, the program’s actual fulfillment came while the share 
price approached its zenith. The purchases, numbering in the billions of dollars and financed by 
debt, ultimately purchased shares around the $30 per share level according to filings on average 
purchase price121.  
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At the same time as management sought to purchase shares at their peak, the company’s 
cash balance, which was increasingly dwarfed by the company’s long term debt, dwindled. Thus, 
the company's call to return value to shareholders was fleeting to say the least and ultimately 
actually illusory as the company leveraged itself to fulfill the promise and eventually did not 
even fulfill it at all. Despite many firms doing the same thing, as the IMF notes, GE’s status as a 
classic blue chip stock, a Dow 30 component, and one of the oldest companies in American 
quickly drew raised eyebrows and, crucially, a watchful eye from credit ratings agencies. 
Moody’s, as a point of reference, quickly called the move a means by which financial 
maneuvering and undue risk taking was being pursued in favor of equity shareholders and 
explicitly at the expense of the firm’s growing list of creditors124. In due time, this would appear 
prescient as the demise of the American institution nearly came from it’s own internal 
mismanagement, not least in gross capital misallocation on buybacks almost exclusively as share 
prices rose.  
In fact, Moody’s assigned credit rating to the company fell precipitously in the ensuing 
years as the company poured capital into ultimately non-essential programs and buybacks. In just 
three years, the company would see its credit rating fall from just below the uppermost echelon 
to just one rung above junk125 and the stock fell along with it. The issue thereafter was an 
inability to secure affordable financing to care for the rejuvenation of the business and created 
problems with refinancing existing debt. Despite numerous restructuring efforts amidst its 
myriad of ancillary problems, the company barely managed to recover to a point of sustainability 
and continued to operate free cash flow negative. Indeed, simply in order to remain a viable 
 




business, numerous profitable units had to be sold off in order to raise cash to repay debts and 
attend to pension and other financial obligations. 
Lost within the discussion was management’s proclivity to expend cash reserves and 
thereafter even take on debt to chase equity returns at precisely the wrong point. Perhaps 
foreseeably in the context of this paper’s framing, the buybacks followed and amplified during 
the cycle, reaching a fever pitch at the peak of the cycle. 
Somewhat ironically, the company did not actually end up completing its program of 
promised share repurchases and further cut its dividend to a minimum amount. While these 
expenditures were essentially cut  to zero, the company still required the  spinning off profitable 
businesses that it might not have otherwise needed to offload had capital been expended more 
wisely and not built upon a ponzi-esque bullishness that came unfortunately late within the cycle. 
 To this end, one can readily see that the rather rapid recovery from the Great Financial 
Crisis fomented a behavior that chased equity returns available in purchasing their own shares. 
The newfound stability in the recovery the shares were enjoying coaxed management to 
repurchase more aggressively, which in turn helped promote even more share appreciation. The 
crucial lesson in GE however is that it quickly moved beyond mere speculation toward the final 
end of ponzi behavior by piling on debt to satiate shareholders with buybacks while ultimately 
burning their creditors. While a herculean effort by a new CEO in late 2018 aided in revitalizing 
the company, an effort in which buybacks and dividends were essentially removed from 
company strategy, the company’s careless spending on share repurchases helped in leaving the 
company basically helpless to deal with the catastrophic impact of Coronavirus. 




 Of course, alluded to consistently throughout the paper is the subject of bailouts that 
followed after the now-established fragility that share buybacks had a hand in fomenting. The 
near immediate response of the US federal government and the Federal Reserve in loosening 
credit requirements and providing grants and low interest loans to companies totaled trillions of 
dollars, the largest such action since the financial crisis.  
 The programs aimed at helping businesses were spearheaded by the Coronavirus Aid, 
Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES) Act and its subsidiary Paycheck Protection 
Program (PPP). In total, the program provided $2.2 trillion in aid to businesses large and small, 
hospitals, healthcare providers, as well as one-time cash payments126. While the PPP Program is 
worth exploring in terms of assistance to many firms maintaining solvency, it remained largely 
contingent on employment and is therefore an arm’s length removed from buybacks. Many other 
aspects of the CARES Act aimed at businesses, by contrast, consisted of outright cash grants and 
low-interest loans127 that took employment less explicitly into account and therefore is more 
interwoven with the situation the companies had placed themselves into in the years prior. This 
was highlighted foremostly by hotels, cruise lines, and perhaps to the largest extent, airlines128. 
While cruise lines were largely left out in the cold due to their typically offshore domiciles and 
hotels were largely catered to via the PPP program and a modicum of loan forgiveness, airlines 
were uniquely attended to by the government.  
Per Division A, Title IV, Subtitle A of the act129, $25 billion in loans and loan guarantees 
were offered explicitly to passenger air carriers, repair station operators, and ticket agents while 
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an additional $4 billion was allocated to cargo air carriers. Further, another $17 billion in loans 
and guarantees were offered to firms like Boeing and GE that were deemed critical to national 
security. Interestingly, alongside the restriction on layoffs of employees contained within the act, 
an explicit prohibition on dividends and share repurchases was instituted to maintain stability 
amidst the crisis130. The structure of the loan programs were differentiated from the bailouts 
offered in the financial crisis a decade earlier, perhaps due to lessons learned and the unforeseen 
political consequences wrought from the provision of blank-check bailouts. To be sure, the 
exogenous nature of this shock made a significant difference in public perception. Yet the rub 
lies not in public perception but the necessity of intervention in order to stave off widespread 
corporate defaults, especially across critical sectors. 
While the issue of stabilizing important national security sectors goes without saying, the 
concern over industries like airlines that perhaps matter far less to national security is less clear. 
Further, with regard to both the firms integral to national security and those not, the issue more 
so lies in the fact that among the many programs aimed at saving American industry, perhaps too 
little attention was paid to the systemic importance of certain firms or the situation that many 
companies put themselves into. Instead, some of the largest loans that were offered were to the 
most indebted companies in the industries receiving aid which, also tended to be the most 
freewheeling with share buybacks despite their precarious financial predicament. Of course, this 





Indeed, salvaging a company that has seen its revenue evaporate during a crisis through 
no fault of its own is likely a worthwhile endeavor and, as many recent papers on the subject of 
the COVID-19 bailouts have laid out, eg. Dick131, Meier et. al132 and others.  
However, yet again, the analysis of the early responses might be best observed at a more 
granular level. In this case, the examination will be done at both a firm and industry level for the 
best glance at the key aspects of government response and its potential pitfalls. 
Case(s) in point: Airlines 
 
In truth, both GE and Boeing are prime examples of the CARES Act swooping in to save 
structurally important companies133. However, in terms of CARES Act funding, both play 
integral roles in supplying an industry that was given some of the largest grants and low-interest 
loans in the immediate aftermath of the COVID outbreak globally. 
 Indeed, share repurchases, along with dividends, and their suspension were cited among 
the foremost risks to liquidity by management in SEC filings immediately following the outbreak 
of COVID-19. 
  
“We are taking a number of actions to improve liquidity. We had paused our open market 
share repurchase program since last year, and in March 2020 our Board of Directors 
terminated its prior authorization to repurchase shares of the Company’s outstanding common 
stock. In March 2020, we also suspended the declaration and/or payment of dividends until 
further notice.” 
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Boeing Corporation 10-K (March 2020)134 
 
 At least in part due to misplaced allocation of their respective cash cushions, both of 
those firms received major grants and low-interest loan programs from the federal government to 
stay afloat135. Both firms were considered strategically significant and therefore were disallowed 
from feeling the impact of the COVID crisis that might have required, at the least, some 
significant firm reorganization. Boeing eschewed the outright grant programs based upon the 
public relations nightmare it entailed, but it nonetheless received tens of billions in loans 136 and 
also aided in allowing each company to issue bonds that would help each remain in business. 
Essentially, a backstop was put in merely by the signal that each company would be saved by the 
government should worse come to worst137. 
However, the industry that both of these companies supply in terms of engines and planes 
was perhaps the most affected by the impact of COVID-19 and received among the largest 
bailout programs as well as paycheck protection program funding was the airline industry. 
Further, in terms of the dynamics established, the industry overall and its larger components are 
exemplars of the Minsky-esque cycle that buybacks drove and, in the end, weakened the balance 
sheets of the companies to the point of requiring significant government intervention. 
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Overall, more than $25 billion in aid was allocated to the US airline companies either 
through loans or grants, with more federal money going towards the more highly levered 
companies and the companies that had pursued a grander scale of buybacks despite their 
leveraged nature. Indeed, the companies that were generating the least free cash flow but 
nonetheless pursuing debt-driven buyback programs were allocated the largest share of aid, 
independent of passenger trends and what might otherwise be considered meaningful figures. 
Despite Alaska Airlines only flying less than one third of the passengers that are flown by 
Southwest Airlines139, it received about half of the funding received by Southwest solely due to 
its capital position after spending billions on buybacks in the years prior.  
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Illustrating the point further was American Airlines which received the largest set of 
grants and loans despite its inability to generate free cash flow and its pursuit of buybacks under 
the auspices of negative cash flow generation.  
 




In fact, American Airlines in particular continued to undertake more and more buyouts 
once its free cash flow turned negative. Therefore the company was necessarily using otherwise 
necessary cash and taking debt in order to repurchase shares. Clearly, the stage of moving toward 
instability envisioned in Minsky’s model of destabilizing stability.  
 




For American Airlines, the pickup in debt levels coincided with the tail end of the cycle 
and, despite losses that threatened the business, more money was piled into share buybacks in the 
apparent hope that such action would help gin up share appreciation. The largest periods of share 
buybacks came in quarters where share prices were abnormally elevated, but the actual core of 
the business was not performing well and cash flow generation was flailing. In the end, this left 
the balance sheet of the company quite vulnerable as revenues disappeared rapidly as the 
coronavirus shut down air traffic completely. 
It was not alone either, as Delta Air Lines amplified its buyback program to about half a 
billion dollars per quarter in the quarters just preceding the coronavirus crisis. This was despite 
its own struggles with free cash flow noted in the chart above. Indeed, each of the airlines largely 
saw the same trend in terms of their share buyback programs that trended along the path of 
instability outlined in the procyclical nature of buybacks. However, it is also clear that some 
airlines took this to a much larger extent than their peers. 
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The exogenous nature of the shock that ultimately eliminated demand, there remains 
questions as to the level of assistance the government must grant after such a weakened balance 
sheet. This is especially so as 96 percent of the free cash flow generated by airline companies 
was put towards payout programs in the form of buybacks143 and, in many cases, the grants 
provided were not enough to save the jobs of many employees that were nonetheless laid off in 
the wake of COVID’s impact. Further, the bailout and loan programs  less than the very needless 
expenditures each airline pursued on buybacks in just the waning years of the bull market cycle 
in many cases and overall less than each of the major airlines’ expenditures over the post-crisis 
period. 
Additionally, the firms that received the most funding from the federal government were 
the worst offenders in terms of pursuing buybacks144. Indeed, American Airlines again led the 
way in fomenting leverage in order to purchase shares while United also pursued debt issuances 
in order to fund its appetite for its own shares. In terms of establishing the firm footing of these 
firms in future, the government’s willingness to quickly glaze over a decade of frivolous capital 
management is a sort of conundrum. 
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This is important as well given the history of some of these firms, particularly in the 
wake of exogenous shocks as it is not the first time that the US airline industry had encountered 
such an issue and instead the highly levered and therefore unstable firms were left to reorganize 
and regroup without a tremendous amount of damage to the industry overall nor to the overall 
economy of the United States. Indeed, numerous airlines have gone through bankruptcy 
throughout history and many others have become consolidated into the major American carriers.  
Additionally, there were no major fears of spillover effects or contagion that might have 
arisen from the airline industry, which also differentiates it from the Great Financial Crisis that 
might have served as a sort of rule by which the government could hold itself liable to act in such 
a dramatic fashion. Given the history of bankruptcies as a viable option for reorganization in the 
 




industry, the move to bail out these companies might indeed have unforeseen consequences in 
forecasting future public policy action. 
However, the bed may have already been made in this case, as there was already 
precedent for a bailout of the airline industry, which perhaps imbued so many airline executives 
with extreme confidence in the probability of their reception of federal assistance. This landmark 
event was, of course, the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center146. Not 
only shocking the nation of the United States, the attack essentially gutted the airline industry 
with demand dropping precipitously due to the widespread fear of flying. In order to stabilize the 
industry in the wake of that extraordinary exogenous shock, the federal government instituted the 
Air Transportation Stabilization Board that offered loan guarantees across the industry147. 
 Though the move was by no means uncontroversial even in its time, it ended up being a 
sort of predecessor to later bailout programs aimed at salvaging American automakers and 
important industries in 2008. This is closely linked to the idea of these industries as strategically 
important and the linkage of many non-US airlines to their respective governments148. Still, there 
is no guarantee as to the long-term solvency of these firms. Indeed, in 2001 widespread 
consolidation of the airline industry and quite a few bankruptcies occurred despite the the 9/11-
related assistance. 
The current conundrum shares some similarities with both 2008 and 20001, though the 
exogenous nature of COVID draws a closer corollary to the latter catastrophe of 9/11. However, 
much of the instability that is seen within the industry is driven by capital mismanagement and 
 
146 de Rugy, V., & Leff, G. (2020). The case against bailing out the airline industry. Special Edition Policy 
Brief. 
147 ibid 
148 Zhang, Fangni, and Daniel J. Graham. "Air transport and economic growth: a review of the impact 
mechanism and causal relationships." Transport Reviews 40, no. 4 (2020): 506-528. 
 
 
overaggressive tactics in terms of share repurchases, especially in terms of the more speculative 
and ponzi end of the spectrum as seen in the case of American Airlines. Nonetheless, these were 
the firms receiving the largest amount of aid and therefore given the most support to remain in 
business despite their demonstrably poor business decisions towards overextension. 
Given that forecasts expect that the United states will take 267.9 years to generate enough 
tax revenue to make the airline grants and bailouts worthwhile149, the question of the rules by 
which the government must feel compelled to intervene are critical to establish. Of course, as 
this is only a relatively small part of the overall $2.2 trillion in assistance earmarked, the question 
of proportionality in terms of providing government assistance is a topic worthy of rumination. 
In future, perhaps the historic payouts and needless expenditures of management will be taken 
into account in terms of providing for such bailout programs. 
8. Conclusion 
 
To be sure, buybacks are no more evil in and of themselves as Minsky considers finance 
and banking. Instead, this paper serves as a note that pro-cyclical share repurchases, that 
themselves can help abet share price increases both through signals and mechanistic effects, that 
they can create the potential for greater market downturns as balance sheets are left without the 
bulwark of a cash cushion, and can ultimately portend insolvency as companies move towards 
the ponzi end and sacrifice solvency in pursuit of equity returns and soaring share prices. 
As Warren Buffett has famously remarked, the growing number of press releases about 
buybacks often make no mention of valuation or specific strategy for buying below a certain 
 
149 Dick, D. L. (2020). Bankruptcy, Bailout, or Bust: Early Corporate Responses to the Business and 
Financial Challenges of COVID-19. Bankruptcy Law Letter, 40(7). 
 
 
price. Instead, it would appear that the tendency of managers to pile more cash into these 
programs is only amplified as valuations rise despite earnings not accelerating to the same 
degree. 
Indicative of this procyclicality, gross share repurchases reached a decade high level in 
2019, just as US equity indices roared to a top well above the nadir that was felt amidst the panic 
only a decade earlier. At that point buybacks were most certainly not on the menu of many 
corporate boards. However, as Hyman Minsky lays out in terms of overextension in financial 
instability, so too can corporate managers overextend on this end. This moves from the 
expenditure of a percentage of free cash flow without necessarily sacrificing other allocations, 
toward the ignorance of other important aspects of the business in order to fund continued 
payouts, and finally towards debt issuance and leverage to sustain that appetite. 
Needless to say, share buybacks imbalance the balance sheet by utilizing cash reserves, 
while often gaming the system in order to gain the acclaim of Wall Street analysts and maintain 
price appreciation for shareholders.  Eventually, as noted in the test cases and the broader data on 
credit markets and leveraged buyback trends, this can quickly unmoor a company from firm 
footing in the event of a major crisis. Thereafter, many of these companies were in need of 
federal and central bank assistance.  
Overall, the test cases and broad data provides a roadmap for the expansionary aspects of 
buybacks and their correlation to broader debt levels. In future, corporate governance should take 
note of these programs and rein them in so as to retain solvency and stability rather than short 
term returns or quarterly results. Similarly, it is important for regulators to take note of these 
trends as it might well serve as a solid indicator of overextension of firms towards ultimately 
non-accretive endeavors. In many cases it may serve as solid criteria to assess the importance of 
 
 
aiding certain firms, just as many creditors might review management’s ability to maintain a 
clean balance sheet. 
 To that end, the question of the moral hazard of these programs, while alluded to, 
is likely a question for further research and perhaps a follow up to this paper after more time has 
passed from the initial pandemic outbreak. Similarly, the proclivity of repurchase programs to 
coincide with looser money policies implemented by central banks is worthy of more 
examination, especially as the inflection after Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell’s pivot 
from hawkish to dovish in late 2018. Lastly, there should be a broader examination of the fear 
that many corporate governors feel about activist shareholders that can often be kept at bay by 
repurchase programs and generous payout policies. This element could well be explanatory and 
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Selected Data Tables and additional descriptions 
 
Table 1. Buybacks compiled over time. Sourced from S&P Buyback data 
 
 
Sector ($millions) Q4,'19 2020 2019 2010-15 2010-2020 Q4,'18 Peak 
Consumer Discretionary $16,620 $29,514 $68,476 $357,762 $738,968 $25,652 
Consumer Staples $9,429 $19,742 $33,838 $181,301 $407,418 $9,588 
Energy $5,025 $4,321 $18,750 $71,996 $249,907 $8,698 
Financials $50,232 $80,685 $178,685 $638,249 $964,426 $45,641 
Healthcare $20,041 $54,082 $83,864 $399,207 $718,573 $31,336 
Industrials $10,218 $33,230 $60,792 $301,986 $573,757 $23,026 
Information Technology $52,432 $201,851 $224,847 $943,530 $1,532,697 $61,298 
Materials $3,117 $8,113 $15,709 $52,466 $119,990 $5,857 
Real Estate $573 $2,661 $2,230 $13,263 $13,263 $1,480 
Communication 
Services 
$13,687 $81,446 $38,192 $140,889 $177,512 $9,556 
Utilities $211 $4,115 $3,355 $10,038 $19,184 $850 
















CARES Total Loans/Grants 
($bn) $7.50 $7.50 $5.60 $3.20 
Net Debt (2019, $bn) $18.31 $21.45 $8.87 $2.45 
 
Table: Largest Buyback Programs since 2010. Source: S&P Global, Howard Silverblatt 
Firm 2015-2020 2010-2020 2010-2015 
Apple $307,213 $423,038 $115,825 
Berkshire Hathaway $30,902 $30,969 $67 
Alphabet $67,159 $69,055 $1,896 
Microsoft $85,832 $128,519 $42,687 
Charter Communications $35,766 $36,582 
$816 
Oracle $85,921 $127,703 $41,782 
Lowe's $19,108 $37,978 $18,870 
Facebook $37,690 $41,515 $3,825 
Procter & Gamble $29,124 $54,406 $25,282 
Intel $45,204 $81,661 $36,457 
Visa $38,328 $55,503 $17,175 
Humana $7,451 $10,338 $2,887 
UnitedHealth Group $17,030 $31,486 $14,456 
Cigna $9,235 $12,954 $3,719 
Honeywell International $17,082 $21,860 $4,778 
Bristol-Myers Squibb $11,866 $15,928 $4,062 
Walmart $32,346 $54,986 $22,640 
HP $11,223 $28,308 $17,085 
Anthem $8,489 $19,042 $10,553 
Amgen $35,684 $51,844 $16,160 






Table 3: Boeing Quarterly Buyback Expenditure. Source: SEC EDGAR  
 





























































Table 4: Qualcomm Share Buyback Expenditure. SEC EDGAR 
 
Qualcomm Share 
Buyback Program  
Date Amount ($millions) 
Dec. 31, 2016 $313.00 
March 31, 2017 $124.00 
June 30, 2017 $259.00 
Dec. 31, 2017 $91.00 
March 31, 2018 -$1.00 
June 30, 2018 $948.00 
Dec. 31, 2018 $991.00 
March 31, 2019 -$149.00 
June 30, 2019 -$18.00 
Dec. 31, 2019 $762.00 
March 31, 2020 $1,404.00 
June 30, 2020 $108.00 
Sept. 30, 2018 $20,940.00 
Sept. 30, 2019 $555.00 
 
 
Table 6: S&P 500 Net Dividend and Buyback Expenditure, compiled by Bank of International 
Settlements. 
 
Year Net Dividends Paid Net Buybacks 
2006 259.39 332.35 
2007 279.87 454.38 
2008 284.16 -73.04 
2009 256.22 35.14 
2010 250 141.2 
2011 281.52 296.1 
2012 324.05 256.72 
 
 
2013 353.55 325.68 
2014 397.15 405.12 
2015 443.35 413.21 
2016 455.83 430.26 
2017 483.01 398.69 
2018 515.8 648.22 
2019 551.95 603.41 
 
Table 7: Airline Industry Annual FCF Generation. Rounded figures, SEC EDGAR 
 
Airline Industry Free Cash flow by 
year ($bn)    
     
 United Airlines 
American 
Airlines Delta Air Lines 
Southwest 
Airlines 
2019 2.4 -0.5 3.5 3 
2018 2 -0.2 1.8 3 
2017 -0.6 -1.2 1.1 1.8 
2016 2.3 0.8 3.8 2.3 
2015 3.2 0.1 5 1.2 



















Table 8 Buybacks to Corporate Debt to Bull Market Correlation.  
Author’s annotations sourced from FRED Data and Bank of International Settlements. 




Bull/Bear (1/0) Annotation 
1995-01-01  $            
1,785,204.00 




1996-01-01  $            
1,876,162.00 




1997-01-01  $            
2,021,164.00 




1998-01-01  $            
2,266,967.00 




1999-01-01  $            
2,511,724.00 




2000-01-01  $            
2,700,361.00 
 $           
 113,828
.60 
1 Dot Com Burst 
2001-01-01  $            
2,899,414.00 




2002-01-01  $            
2,910,483.00 




2003-01-01  $            
2,963,870.00 
 $             
 73,704.
80 
0 Recession ends early in 2003 
2004-01-01  $            
2,994,357.00 




2005-01-01  $            
2,992,643.00 






2006-01-01  $            
3,145,734.00 




2007-01-01  $            
3,352,574.00 
 $           
 454,381
.90 
1 Financial Crisis Begins late 2007 
2008-01-01  $            
3,551,248.00 




2009-01-01  $            
3,725,857.00 




2010-01-01  $            
3,970,254.00 
 $           
 141,202
.60 
0 Recession officially ends late 2009 
2011-01-01  $            
4,170,891.00 




2012-01-01  $            
4,550,807.00 




2013-01-01  $            
4,822,299.00 




2014-01-01  $            
5,143,545.00 




2015-01-01  $            
5,552,613.00 




2016-01-01  $            
5,844,359.00 




2017-01-01  $            
6,168,968.00 




2018-01-01  $            
6,302,780.00 






2019-01-01  $            
6,571,887.00 
 $           
 603,413
.90 
1 Last year of Bull Market Prior to Covid 
 
Table 10. Corporate Debt Trends and Acceleration Post-GFC.  
FRED Graph Observations Federal Reserve Economic Data St. Louis FRED System 
Year Corporate Debt ($m) Delta Debt ($m) 
1998-01-01 2266967  
1999-01-01 2511724 244757 
2000-01-01 2700361 188637 
2001-01-01 2899414 199053 
2002-01-01 2910483 11069 
2003-01-01 2963870 53387 
2004-01-01 2994357 30487 
2005-01-01 2992643 -1714 
2006-01-01 3145734 153091 
2007-01-01 3352574 206840 
2008-01-01 3551248 198674 
2009-01-01 3725857 174609 
2010-01-01 3970254 244397 
2011-01-01 4170891 200637 
2012-01-01 4550807 379916 
2013-01-01 4822299 271492 
2014-01-01 5143545 321246 
2015-01-01 5552613 409068 
2016-01-01 5844359 291746 
2017-01-01 6168968 324609 
2018-01-01 6302780 133812 
2019-01-01 6571887 269107 




Table 11: American Airlines Buyback Program. Source SEC EDGAR System 
Date Buybacks ($m) FCF ($m) 
12/31/2013 $84.00 -144 
3/31/2014 -$56.00 707 
6/30/2014 $127.00 1063 
9/30/2014 $907.00 -1302 
12/31/2014 $ - -302 
3/31/2015 $181.00 617 
6/30/2015 $750.00 1085 
9/30/2015 $1,480.00 0 
12/31/2015 $1,435.00 -501 
3/31/2016 $1,525.00 -1689 
6/30/2016 $1,711.00 -250 
9/30/2016 $695.00 209 
12/31/2016 $569.00 -1926 
3/31/2017 $484.00 -579 
6/30/2017 $529.00 251 
9/30/2017 $359.00 -185 
12/31/2017 $243.00 -1017 
3/31/2018 $461.00 -575 
6/30/2018 $376.00 160 
 




Balance ($m)     
Year 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 








Table 13: Loan amounts approved to air carriers (Source: United States Treasury, COVID-19 
Economic Relief Data) 
Industry Firm Loan Amount 
Travel American Airlines Inc $7,500,000,000 
Travel Delta Air Lines Inc $5,600,000,000 
Travel United Airlines Inc $7,500,000,000 
Travel Alaska Air Group Inc $1,928,000,000 
Travel Hawaiian Holdings Inc $654,000,000 
Travel Southwest Airlines $3,200,000,000 
Travel JetBlue $935,800,000 
Travel Skywest $336,600,000 
Travel Allegiant $150,300,000 
Travel Spirit Airlines $264,300,000 
Travel Mesa $92,500,000 
Travel Atlas $207,000,000 
Travel Air Wisconsin $51,000,000 
Travel Ovation Travel $20,000,000 
Travel Southern Airways Express $1,800,000 
Travel Sun Country Inc. $45,000,000 
Travel Caribbean Sun Airlines $15,000,000 
Travel Allflight Corporation $4,721,260 
Travel Elite Airways $2,630,274 
 
